Kennecot Copper Corporation v. Industrial Commission of Utah and Irene W. Peay, Widow of Justin W. Peay, Deceased : Unknown by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1975
Kennecot Copper Corporation v. Industrial
Commission of Utah and Irene W. Peay, Widow of
Justin W. Peay, Deceased : Unknown
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Vernon Romney; Utah Attorney General; Andrew R. Hurley; Attorneys for Defendant.
James B. Lee; Erie V. Boorman; Parsons, Behle, and Latimer; Attorneys for Plaintiff.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Copper Corp v. Industrial Commission of Utah, No. 13676.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1975).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/70
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF D 
LAW LIBRARY 
KENNECOTT COPPER P^ c 9 1975 
CORPORATION,
 plMSff\ 
v s BRIGHAWi YOUNG UNIVERSITY 
J. ReubcnXMiLaw School 
THE INDUSTRIAL > T^TR' 
COMMISSION OF UTAH and ' 
IRENE W. PEAY, Widow of 
JUSTIN W. PEAY, Deceased, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFFS BRIEF 
Original Proceeding to Review an Award 
of the Industrial Commission of Utah 
JAMES B. LEE and 
ERIE V. BOOKMAN 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
VERNON ROMNEY Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Utah Attorney General 79 South State Street 
State Capitol Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Defendant 
The Industrial Commission of Utah 
Andrew R. Hurley ^ , 
1011 Walker Bank Building
 ir** % B jT-' 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 L . 1 1 
Attorney for Defendant fj | L, 
Irene W. Peay y ,.,-,-?
 A 
Clerk, Supremo Court, U*ah Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
a\j»*I 
-audom //loiTAavia'iMoo ov, T A H T 
aa TIAO .8«8T/ia(iza JAIHUM OVII 
-an HHT Hea.i via craflavooaii 
er-i:-&8 VLOIT'JW riO (iTKMMMIUg 
?,I CIHr*8ITA8 WMMa HVAH 
SS:
 TABLE O F C O N T E N W H I J J ' J / U X ) 
Page 
STATEMENT q F ^ A T U ^ E ^ p F CASE 1 
DISPOSITION BY THE 
INDUSTRIAr]u>0®fteiMESIffiNc<^^^ 
RELIEF•ZQV&ft><WAMffltotil^:L}}i; 2 
sTATEM%M¥rb*'^IM ^ ^ ^ ; ^ i ^ e ¥ 
STATEMENT .OE..POINTS(Ml>l.)..s:ia.J^JX.iO r 5 
POINT fei-ifiBGZTIONJa^fiHa<tt)J(«^ ..UTJAmi'ji;'! 
CODE A N N O T A T E ® ; ! 1 ^ AS: AMEND*' ao'J 
ICED,.BARS FIECQVERY B^DlQEFENBr.'l 8IS 
ANT OF T H E BURIAL EXPENSES ,, ,.., 
AWARM&TMtfM ' 
...ORDER E N T f i K B B w ^ ^ f e t o M ' ; 0 ; ; 
^ 9 7 i B Y T H E INDUSTRIAL CO^MIS- " 
SION OF UTAH 5 
4^^?^^Of'JM-n iM J^Wr>tf'/I-A"^af Il ,^J*» lATf! 
A. THE CLEAR LANGUAGE AND IN-
01 .TEH'BOF«^a^M&(b)^a>A-BAE)REC€^*I^it -A 
<> « » 1 W « ^ 
II ,(EBSSBKA.Tf<irFRiOM^IDTCO^ISREH< i - ^ 
- 4 S M W M ^ 
i 1 " U T A H f u F ^ M E ^ d U R V r i 
*I .SUPPOROM&L'Al'MP^F^ P©#fiDLQNiloiio a 
iii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
T H A T NO COMPENSATION, I N C L U D -
I N G B U R I A L E X P E N S E S , CAN B E 
R E C O V E R E D U N L E S S T H E R E -
Q U I R E M E N T S O F SECTION 35-2-13 
H A V E B E E N S A T I S F I E D 15 
CONCLUSION 22 
CASES C I T E D 
Henrie v. Rocky Mountain Packing Corp., 
113 Utah 415, 196 P.2d 487 (1948) 18, 22 
Masich v. United States Smelting, Refining & 
Mining Co., et al, 113 Utah 101, 
191 P.2d612 (1948) 20, 22 
Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, et al, 118 Utah 46, 
218 P.2d 970 (1950) 15 
Silver King Coalition Mines Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, et al, 2 Utah 2d 1, 268 
P.2d 689 (1954) 16 
S T A T U T E S A N D C O N S T I T U T I O N O F U T A H 
Article XVI , Section 5—Constitution of Utah 19 
Section 12, Chapter 41, Laws of Utah, 1941 8, 10 
Section 13, Chapter 41, Laws of Utah, 1941 .... 6, 10, 11 
Section 15, Chapter 41, Laws of Utah, 1941 8, 10 
Section 25, Chapter 41, Laws of Utah, 1941 13 
Section 26, Chapter 41, Laws of Utah, 1941 12 
ii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
Section 42-1-42(6) U.C.A. 1943 19 
Section 42-la(13) U.C.A. 1943 8 
Section 42-la-(13) (b) (3) U.C.A. 1943 15, 16, 17 
Section 42-la-25 U.C.A. 1943 13 
Section 42-la-49 U.C.A. 1943 14 
Section 35-1-44(6) U.C.A. 1953, as amended 20 
Section 35-1-44(7) U.C.A. 1953, as amended 19 
Section 35-1-99 U.C.A. 1953, as amended 20 
Section 35-2-12 U.C.A. 1953, as amended 8 
Section 35-2-12 (b) U.C.A. 1953, as amended .... 19, 20 
Section 35-2-12 (c) U.C.A. 1953, as amended 19 
Section 35-2-12 (e) U.C.A. 1953, as amended 9 
Section 35-2-13 U.C.A. 1953 8, 14, 15, 22 
Section 35-2-13 (a) U.C.A. 1953, 
as amended 10, 15, 17 
Section 35-2-13 (a) (3) U.C.A. 1953, as amended .... 9 
Section 35-2-13 (a) (4) U.C.A. 1953, as amended .... 14 
Section 35-2-13 (b) U.C.A. 1953, 
as amended 11, 15, 17 
Section 35-2-13 (b) (3) U.C.A. 1953, 
as amended 4, 5, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17, 18, 22 
Section 35-2-13 (b) (5) U.C.A. 1953, as amended .... 14 
Section 35-2-15 U.C.A. 1953, as amended 8, 10 
Section 35-2-15 (e) U.C.A. 1953, as amended 4 
Section 35-2-25 U.C.A. 1953 12 
Section 35-2-48 U.C.A. 1953, 
as amended 11, 12, 14, 20 
Section 35-2-56 U.C.A. 1953, as amended 11 
iii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
K E N N E C O T T C O P P E R \ 
CORPORATION,
 p ^ w / j 
VS. 
T H E I N D U S T R I A L 
COMMISSION OF U T A H and 
I R E N E W. P E A Y , Widow of 
J U S T I N W. P E A Y , Deceased, 
PLAINTIFFS BRIEF 
S T A T E M E N T OF N A T U R E OF CASE 
This is an original proceeding before the Supreme 
Court of Utah for the purpose of having the lawful-
ness of an Amended Order dated February 22, 1974 
and finalized on April 15, 1974 by the Industrial Com-
mission of Utah in proceedings entitled Irene W. Peay, 
Widow of Justin W. Peay, deceased, applicant v. Ken-
necott Copper Corporation, defendant, File No. 2U5-
OD-148, inquired into and determined as provided by 
§35-2-37, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
Case No. 
13676 
its. 
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D I S P O S I T I O N BY T H E I N D U S T R I A L 
COMMISSION O F U T A H 
On January 8, 1974, the Industrial Commission of 
Utah in Claim No. 2U5-OD-148 issued Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order in favor of Ken-
necott Copper Corporation and against applicant, Irene 
W. Peay, Widow of Justin W. Peay, deceased. Irene 
W. Peay, on January 10, 1974, filed with the Commis-
sion a Motion for Review and on February 22, 1974, 
the Industrial Commission of Utah issued an Amended 
Order in favor of Irene W. Peay and against Kenne-
cott Copper Corporation allowing burial benefits to 
applicant Irene W. Peay as widow of Justin W. Peay, 
deceased. Kennecott Copper Corporation, plaintiff 
herein, on March 13, 1974, filed with the Industrial 
Commission of Utah a Motion for Review of the Feb-
ruary 22, 1974 Amended Order. The Motion for Re-
view was denied by Order entered by the Industrial 
Commission of Utah on April 15, 1974. Plaintiff filed 
this action with the Supreme Court of Utah on April 
25,1974. 
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON R E V I E W 
Plaintiff, Kennecott Copper Corporation, upon 
this review seeks to have the Amended Order issued 
by the Industrial Commission on February 22, 1974 
set aside in its entirety. 
2 
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S T A T E M E N T OF F A C T S 
The essential facts pertinent to this controversy are 
not in dispute and may be summarized as follows: 
Justin W. Peay worked at the Arthur Plant of 
plaintiff from March 1913 until June 30, 1956 at which 
time he was retired under the pension plan for hourly 
employees for permanent and total disability. On June 
21, 1956, the Industrial Commission entered a tentative 
Order of total permanent disability due to third degree 
silicosis with inactive tuberculosis and plaintiff was 
ordered to pay weekly compensation benefits to said 
Justin W. Peay, beginning July 1, 1956 and continu-
ing for five (5) years thereafter or until further order 
of the Commission, but in no event to exceed the then 
statutory maximum of $12,100.00 (R. 5). On De-
cember 20, 1961, a final Order of permanent total dis-
ability was entered by the Commission based upon the 
certification from the Division of Vocational Rehabili-
tation that Justin W. Peay could not be vocationally 
rehabilitated (R. 9). Plaintiff in said Order was di-
rected to continue weekly compensation payments until 
the statutory maximum of $12,100.00 was paid in full 
after which Mr. Peay was placed upon the Combined 
Injury Benefit Fund for the remainder of his life. 
Justin W. Peay died at the age of 84 on January 
11, 1973, almost seventeen (17) years after he last 
worked for plaintiff, Kennecott Copper Corporation, 
and this claim was filed with the Industrial Commis-
sion of Utah by his widow, Irene W. Peay, on Feb-
ruary 21, 1973 seeking payment of burial bonefits pur-
3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
suant to §35-2-15 (e), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended. Plaintiff contended that as a matter of law, 
the provisions of §35-2-13(b) (3), Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953, as amended, barred the recovery by ap-
plicant of any death compensation benefits, including 
burial expenses, where, as here, the death of the em-
ployee occurred more than five (5) years from the last 
day upon which the employee actually worked for the 
employer against whom compensation was claimed. 
The hearing examiner agreed with plaintiff herein and 
on January 8, 1974 issued Findings of Fact, Conclu-
sions of Law and Order dismissing the claim for burial 
benefits (R. 77). Mrs. Peay's Motion for Review was 
filed on January 10, 1974 and the Industrial Commis-
sion on February 22, 1974 entered an Amended Order 
(Commissioner Stephen Hadley dissenting) in favor 
of Irene W. Peay for burial expenses in the amount of 
$450.00, said sum being the statutory amount at the 
time the employee was determined to be totally and 
permanently disabled (R. 82). Plaintiff filed a Motion 
for Review on March 13, 1974 (R. 85) ; and a further 
Motion was filed in behalf of the applicant on March 
14, 1974 (R. 87) claiming that burial benefits should 
be allowed in the amount specified by law at the time 
of death. The Industrial Commission by Order dated 
April 15, 1974 affirmed the Amended Order of Fe-
ruary 22, 1974 and denied both Motions for Review 
(R. 88). Plaintiff filed this action on April 25, 1974 
requesting the Supreme Court of Utah to set aside the 
Amended Order of February 22, 1974 issued by the 
Industrial Commission of Utah (R. 89). 
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S T A T E M E N T OF P O I N T S 
P O I N T I 
SECTION 35-2-13 (b) (3), U T A H CODE ANNO-
T A T E D 1953, AS A M E N D E D , BARS RECOV-
E R Y BY D E F E N D A N T O F T H E B U R I A L 
E X P E N S E S A W A R D E D TO H E R I N T H E 
A M E N D E D O R D E R E N T E R E D ON F E B R U -
A R Y 22, 1974 BY T H E I N D U S T R I A L COM-
MISSION O F U T A H . 
A R G U M E N T 
A. THE CLEAR LANGUAGE AND INTENT 
OF §35-2-13(b) (3) BAR RECOVERY FOR ALL 
COMPENSATION, INCLUDING BURIAL 
EXPENSES, UNLESS DEATH FROM SILI-
COSIS RESULTS WITHIN FIFE YEARS 
AFTER TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT. 
Justin W. Peay died on January 11, 1974 almost 
seventeen (17) years after he last worked for plaintiff. 
Plaintiff contends that both the intent and the clear 
language of the Utah Occupational Disease Act, §35-
2-13 (b) (3), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, 
make it apparent that a claim by Mr. Peay's widow 
for death benefits of any kind, including burial ex-
penses, is barred by the provisions of that limitation 
statute. 
§35-2-13(b) (3) reads as follows: 
"There is imposed upon every employer a liabil-
ity for the payment of compensation to the de-
5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
pendents of every employee in cases where death 
results from an occupational disease, subject to 
the following conditions: 
(3) No compensation shall be paid for death 
from silicosis unless the death results within two 
years from the last day upon which the employee 
actually worked for the employer against whom 
compensation is claimed, except: 
(a) in those cases where death results during a 
period of continuous total disability from sili-
cosis for which compensation has been paid or 
awarded, or (b) in those cases where death re-
sults from silicosis complicated by active tuber-
culosis and such silico-tuberculosis is evidenced 
by positive laboratory sputum tests and X-rays 
and other clinical findings, and in such cases 
compensation shall be paid if such death results 
within five years from the last day upon which 
the employee actually worked for the employer 
against whom compensation is claimed" (em-
phasis added) 
I t is apparent from the above that the maximum 
time for any compensation for death by silicosis in any 
form is five (5) years after the last day the employee 
worked for the employer against whom compensation 
is claimed. Indeed, for silicosis such as involved herein, 
the same limitation has been in existence since the 
Utah Occupational Disease Disability Law was first 
passed in 1941. The limitation provisions at that time 
were found in Chapter 41, Section 13 and read in perti-
nent part as follows: 
"Section 13 — Employer Liability for Compen-
sation-Conditions When no Payment to Be Paid. 
6 
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(a) There is imposed upon every employer a 
liability for the payment of compensation to 
every employee who becomes totally disabled by 
reason of an occupational disease subject to the 
following conditions: 
( i ) . . . 
(2) . . . 
(3) No compensation shall be paid in case of 
silicosis unless during the ten years immediately 
preceding the disablement the injured employee 
shall have been exposed to harmful quantities of 
silicon dioxide (Si02) dust for a total period of 
not less than five years in this state and unless 
total disability results within two years from the 
last day upon which the employee actually work-
ed for the employer against whom compensation 
is claimed. 
(4) . . . 
(b) There is imposed upon every employer a 
liability for the payment of compensation to the 
dependents of every employee in cases where 
death results from an occupational disease, sub-
ject to the following conditions: 
( i ) . . . 
(2) . • . 
(3) No compensation shall be paid for death 
from silicosis unless the death results within two 
years from the last day upon which the employee 
actually worked for the employer against whom 
compensation is claimed, except in those cases 
where death results during a period of continu-
ous total disability from silicosis for which com-
pensation has been paid or awarded, and in such 
cases compensation shall be paid if such death 
7 
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results within five years from the last day upon 
which the employee actually worked for the em-
ployer against whom compensation is claimed/3 
(emphasis added). 
(5) . . . 
The provisions set forth above became §42-la-13, 
Utah Code Annotated until 1953 when it became §35-
2-13, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. The section then, 
as now, required reading and interpretation in con-
junction with the Definitions set forth in Section 12 
(now §35-2-12) and the Benefits listed in Section 15 
(now §35-2-15). 
Section 12-Terms Construed-Definitions-of the 
1941 act read as pertinent hereto as follows: 
"The following terms as used in this act shall be 
construed as follows: 
(a) . . . 
(b) 'Compensation3 shall mean the payments 
and benefits provided for in this act. 
(c) 'Award' shall mean the finding or decision 
of the commission as to the amount of compensa-
tion due any disabled or the dependents of any 
deceased employee." (emphasis added). 
(d) . . . 
And Section 15-Benefits-Amounts. 
"The benefits to which a disabled employee or 
his dependents shall be entitled under this act 
are limited to the following: 
8 
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(a) Where claim is by the employee he shall be 
entitled to and shall receive compensation in the 
amount of $12 per week during total disability 
plus 5% of such award for each dependent minor 
child under the age of eighteen years up to a 
maximum of five such dependent children, pro-
vided that in no event shall the total of such pay-
ments exceed $3,000. 
(b) I n case of death the dependents of the de-
ceased employee shall be entitled to and shall re-
ceive the difference between the sum paid for 
total disability as in paragraph (a) of this sec-
tion provided and the maximum amount of 
$3,000; payments to be made at the rate of $12 
per week plus 10% of such weekly payment for 
each dependent minor child under the age of 
eighteen years up to a maximum of five depend-
ent minor children. 
(c) I n the event an employee becomes totally 
disabled from an occupational disease, the em-
ployer shall furnish and pay for such medical 
service, hospitalization and medicines as may be 
reasonably required, but not to exceed the sum 
of $500. 
(d) In case death results from such occupational 
disease the employer shall pay not to exceed $150 
burial expenses" (emphasis added) . 
The above provisions, then and now, present a clear 
picture of disablement, compensation — including death 
benefits, medical expenses and burial expenses — and 
the conditions when no payment of any kind need be 
paid. Refinements have been made to provide for 
such things as partial permanent disability (see §35-
2-12(e), and for disablement [§35-2-13(a) (3) ] or 
9 
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death [35-2-13(b) (3) (b)] from silicosis complicated 
by active tuberculosis, as well as for vocational rehab-
ilitation (§35-2-15), changes in the limitation periods 
and benefit amounts, including allowances for death 
benefits, medical expenses and burial expenses. The 
basic provisions, however, including all those applicable 
to this controversy, have remained in effect through-
out the life of the Utah Occupational Disease Dis-
ability Law. 
The provisions pertinent to this inquiry do not re-
quire any sophisticated explanation or interpretation 
and may be summarized as follows: 
1. Compensation means just what it says in Section 
12 (1941 and today) viz: ". . . the payments and bene-
fits provided for in this act. 
2. Benefits include the weekly amounts set forth 
in Section 15 and include also death benefits, medical 
expenses, and burial expenses all of which have been 
increased by the legislature from time to time through 
the years. 
3. The conditions set forth in Section 13 when no 
payment need be made mean just what they specify, 
viz: no compensation of any kind need be paid under 
any of the conditions specified in that chapter. 
For example, in a silicosis claim such as that in-
volved herein, subsection (a) of Section 13 (§35-2-13 
(a)) sets forth clearly the requirements before disabil-
ity compensation of any kind need be paid. 
10 
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(1) Disability must be total (separate provisions 
now appear in §35-2-56 for permanent partial dis-
ability.) 
(2) Exposure requirements — 5 years in this state 
during 15 years immediately preceding the disable-
ment. 
(3) Disability (total) must result within 2 years 
from last day employee actually worked for the em-
ployer against whom compensation is claimed (5 years 
if silicosis is complicated by active tuberculosis). 
(4) Claim must be filed within time fixed by §35-
2-48. 
Likewise, subsection (b) of Section 13 [§35-2-13 
(b)] establishes with similar clarity the requirements 
before compensation of any kind need be paid to de-
pendents where death has resulted to the employee from 
silicosis: 
(1) Exposure requirements — 5 years during the 
15 years immediately preceding disablement. 
(2) Death must result within two (2) years after 
last day employee actually worked for the employer 
against whom compensation is claimed. This 2 year 
limitation is extended to 5 years from last day worked 
where death results during a period of continuous total 
disability and compensation has been paid or awarded 
(see subsection (b) (3) of Section 13). There is also 
a 5 year limitation in cases where death results from 
silicosis complicated by active tuberculosis. However, 
11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
both the disability under subsection (a) (3) and the 
death under subsection (b) (3) of Section 13 must 
result within 5 years, at the most, from the last day 
worked in order to qualify for compensation of any 
kind under the Utah statute. 
(3) Claim for death benefits also must be filed 
within time fixed by §35-2-48. 
The requirements of the statute set forth above 
for silicosis disability and/or death compensation pay-
ments have been in effect since 1951; prior to that time, 
exposure requirements were more restrictive (5 years in 
last 10 years) and there was no provision for silicosis 
complicated by active tuberculosis. I t seems clear, 
therefore, that the limitations for compensation pay-
ment were clearly expressed by the Utah Legislature 
from the beginning and have continued to be applicable 
except as specifically refined or modified since that 
time. 
One such specific modification is found in Section 
26 of the original Act, reading as follows: 
"No compensation shall be allowed for the first 
seven (7) days of disability, unless such disabil-
ity continues for a period of more than four con-
tinuous weeks, except the disbursements author-
ized for medical, nurse and hospital services, and 
for medicines and funeral expenses, shall be made 
by the employer." (emphasis added). 
This provision later was amended and became §35-2-25, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as follows: 
12 
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"No compensation shall be allowed for the first 
3 days of disability, except the disbursements 
herein authorized for medical, nurse and hospital 
services and for medicine and funeral expenses." 
In both cases the reference is to "no compensation shall 
be allowed. . . . " then the exception is made for med-
ical expenses and burial expenses for special applica-
tion of that particular section, thus indicating beyond 
question that unless excepted, compensation refers to 
medical and burial expenses as well as to the weekly 
payments. 
Another such modification which confirms the lit-
eral construction of compensation asserted herein by 
plaintiff is found in Section 25 of the original Act, 
since repealed, reading in part as follows: 
"Compensation when payable under this act, ex-
clusive of medical, hospital and funeral benefits, 
for disability or death due to silicosis, notwith-
standing anything in this act otherwise provided, 
shall be payable to employees, or their depend-
ents, in the following manner and amounts: . . ." 
§42-la-25. 
Here again, the normal and literal application accorded 
to "compensation" has been modified to exclude med-
ical, hospital and funeral benefits for purposes of the 
application of that particular statutory provision. The 
clear inference which follows from such language is 
that compensation includes medical, hospital and fun-
eral expenses for other purposes of the act, just as the 
definition specifically expresses. 
13 
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Finally, reference to the limitations set forth in the 
Occupational Disease Act for the filing of compensa-
tion claims in Section 49 of the original act (§42-la-49) 
and presently found in §35-2-48, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953, as amended, indicates beyond reasonable 
controversy that compensation as used therein includes 
all the benefits included in the definition; i.e. weekly 
payments, medical and hospital expenses, death bene-
fit payments and funeral expenses. Surely, it could not 
reasonably be contended that a claim for "compensa-
tion" barred because not filed in time under §35-2-48 is 
not barred also for burial expenses or medical expenses 
because "compensation" as used in §35-2-48 does not 
spell out the inclusion of all the benefits found in §35-
2-15. We submit that "compensation" includes all the 
benefits referred to in the definition for purposes of 
§35-2-13 here in controversy as well as for §35-2-48; 
the language is used in identical fashion in both sec-
tions and properly requires the same construction. In-
deed, §35-2-13(a) (4) and §35-2-13(b) (5) both refer 
to "compensation" claims which must be filed as set 
forth in §35-2-48 in order to qualify for any compensa-
tion for disability or dearth respectively. 
In view of the above, plaintiff Kennecott Cop-
per Corporation asserts that the language of the Utah 
Occupational Disease Disability Law is both clear and 
consistent (1) with respect to the requirements to be 
met in order to qualify for payment of compensation 
for disability or death, (2) with respect to the filing of 
claims for such compensation and (3) with respect to 
14 
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the inclusion of burial expenses as compensation under 
the proper application of those provisions, including 
specifically the application of §35-2-13(b) (3) which 
clearly requires that death must result within five (5) 
years after termination of employment in order to 
qualify for any death benefits, including burial ex-
penses. 
B. UTAH SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
SUPPORT PLAINTIFFS POSITION THAT 
NO COMPENSATION, INCLUDING BUR-
IAL EXPENSES, CAN BE RECOVERED 
UNLESS THE REQUIREMENTS OF SEC-
TION 35-2-13 HAVE BEEN SATISFIED. 
A plethora of case authority would not be ex-
pected for a proposition so obvious and so clearly ex-
pressed in the language of §35-2-13 of the Utah Occu-
pational Disease Statute. However, there are clear 
indications from Utah Supreme Court decisions that 
burial expenses are indeed a part of "compensation" 
under the Utah Occupational Disease Law and that 
the exposure limitations and the time limitations for 
disability and death after termination of employment 
set forth in §35-2-13(a) and (b) operate as a bar to 
recovery of any compensation under the act unless the 
requirements of the section are met. 
In Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, et al, 118 Utah 46, 218 P.2d 970 (1950), 
the Utah Supreme Court applied literally the clear 
language of §42-la-13(b) (3) (now §35-2-13(b) (3)) 
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to reverse a death benefit award which included burial 
expenses. In that case., the employee died more than 
two (2) years but less than five (5) years after his 
last day of employment with plaintiff-employer. He 
had filed for compensation for silicosis but no award 
had been made at the time of his death. 
There was no contention that any part of the 
award would not be subject to application of the limit-
ation statute; the issue was whether or not an actual 
award was necessary prior to the employee's death in 
order to extend the time of death limitation from 2 to 
5 years from date of last employment. The court held 
that the language was clear and unambiguous and re-
quired literal application despite the hardship imposed 
in that particular case (118 Utah 56) but stated: 
". . . We are mindful of the hardship imposed in 
this case, but even so we are powerless to re-
write the statute or escape its effect. . ." 
The award was vacated in its entirety including 
the amount awarded for burial expenses, indicating 
clearly that that item also came within the qualifica-
tion requirements of §42-la-13(b) (3), which is pre-
cisely what plaintiff E^ennecott Copper Corporation 
has asserted throughout this controversy. 
In Silver King Coalition Mines Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, et al. 2 Utah 2d 1, 268 P.2d 689 (1954), 
the statute in controversy was, as here, §35-2-13(b) (3). 
The Industrial Commission compensation award in-
cluded medical expenses and burial expenses. The issue 
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was whether to apply the silicosis 2 year limitation after 
date of last employment under §42-la-13(b) (3) or 
the 1951 amendment which added a 5 year limitation 
after date of last employment in §35-2-13 (b) (3) (b) 
for silicosis complicated by active tuberculosis. There 
was no contention that burial expenses or medical ex-
penses or any other portion of the award would have a 
longer period than that specified in the applicable sta-
tute ; indeed the court stated: 
"It is conceded that if the amendment does not 
apply, compensation cannot be awarded for the 
death of Glade Mitchell inasmuch as his death 
occurred more than three years after termination 
of his employment with the mining company. . ." 
(emphasis added). (2 Utah 2d 4) 
We submit that such reference to "compensation" 
is consistent with the language of the Occupational 
Disease Disability Act and includes-just as the legis-
lature intended-medical and hospital expenses and 
burial expenses in addition to weekly benefits. As the 
above language indicates, all parties seem to have ac-
cepted the interpretation that compensation for death 
or disability is not divisible insofar as application of 
the requirements of §35-2-13(a) or (b) is concerned. 
I t is significant to note that in the Mitchell case 
described above, the Supreme Court of Utah held that 
the dependent widow had a separate and distinct cause 
of action which arose at the date of death of the de-
ceased employee and, therefore, the 5 year limitation 
"from the last day upon which the employee actually 
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worked for the employer. . ." applied for determination 
of her eligibility for compensation. 
Since the deceased employee died within 5 years of 
his last day of employment, his dependent widow was 
entitled under §35-2-13(b) (3) to compensation which 
included also medical expenses and burial expenses. In 
this case, however, the dependent widow does not qualify 
for any death benefits because 17 years elapsed be-
tween the date of death of Justin W. Peay and the last 
day upon which he worked for his employer, Kenne-
cott Copper Corporation. The same statute, §35-2-
13(b) (3), is applicable to the claim of Mrs. Peay and 
by its clearly expressed terms, no compensation pay-
ment need be paid for death benefits, including, of 
course, burial expenses. 
Finally, the Utah Supreme Court decision in 
Henrie v. Rocky Mountain Packing Corporation, 113 
Utah 415, 196 P.2d 487, (1948) makes it clear beyond 
reasonable controversy that "compensation" as used in 
the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act (as well as 
the Occupational Disease Disability Law here involved) 
includes burial expenses and medical and hospitalization 
expenses in addition to disability payments. The lan-
guage of the court (113 Utah 427-28) : 
" 'Compensation' as used in the amendment to 
the Consitution, means the same as it is used and 
defined in the compensation act, i.e. any pay-
ment required by the act to be made to a work-
man or to his dependents, or for their benefit, or 
into the state treasury for the special purposes 
of the compensation act. This includes disability 
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payments, death benefits, medical and hospitaliz-
ation expenses, burial expenses, and payments 
into the state treasury as provided by the act. . " 
(emphasis supplied) and further: 
"The payment of part of decedent's burial ex-
penses . . . in the state treasury in accordance 
with the order of the Industrial Commission, 
and as provided by statute, was payment of 'com-
pensation' within the meaning of Article XVI , 
Section 5, of the Constitution." 
The definition of compensation in the Workmen's 
Compensation Act at that time was: "The payments 
and benefits provided for in this title" (§42-1-42(6), 
Utah Code Annotated, 1943), a definition identical to 
that found in the Occupational Disease Disability Law 
applicable to this case, viz: (§35-2-12(b)), Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended. 
As indicated above the Henrie case refers to the 
tie-in between "compensation" as used and defined in 
the Compensation Act and as used in Article XVI , 
Section 5 of the Utah Constitution. There is a similar 
tie-in relationship in many areas between the Utah Oc-
cupational Disease Disability Law and the Utah Work-
men's Compensation Act. For instance, both the Work-
men's Compensation Act in §35-1-44(7) and the Occu-
pational Law in §35-2-12(c) define "award" as the 
"finding or decision of the Commission as to the amount 
of compensation due any injured (disabled) or the de-
pendents of any deceased employee". Obviously, the 
"award" and thus the "compensation" includes under 
both statutes medical and hospitalization expenses and 
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burial expenses in addition to weekly and/or lump-sum 
benefit payments. Likewise the term "compensation" 
is identical as found in the two acts: §35-1-44(6) in the 
Workmen's Compensation Act and §35-2-12 (b) in the 
Occupational Disease Law both construing the term in 
its broadest sense i.e. the "payments and benefits pro-
vided for in this title (act)". Another pertinent and 
significant likeness is found in the following limitation 
statutes: 
Workmen's Compensation §35-1-99: 
" . . . .If no notice of the accident and injury is 
given to the employer within one year from the 
date of the accident, the right to compensation 
shall be wholly barred. If no claim for compen-
sation is filed with the industrial commission 
within three years from the date of the accident 
or the date of the last payment of compensation, 
the right to compensation shall be wholly barred." 
(emphasis added). 
Occupational Disease Law-§35-2-48: 
"The right to compensation under this act for 
disability or death from an occupational disease 
shall be forever barred unless written claim is 
filed with the commission within the time as in 
this section hereinafter provided: . . . " (empha-
sis added). 
Obviously "compensation" as used above includes 
the other benefits, including burial expenses, for the in-
tended application of the limitation provisions of both 
acts. Such statutory construction was evidenced in 
Masich v. United, States Smelting, Refining & Mining 
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Co., et al, 113 Utah 101, 191 P.2d 612 (1948) in which 
the Supreme Court of Utah applied former interpreta-
tions of the exclusive remedy provisions of the Work-
men's Compensation Act to similar provisions in the 
Occupational Disease Act to deny common law remedy 
to an employee partially disabled by an occupational 
disease, even though the Occupational Disease Act did 
not provide compensation for such partial disability. 
In recognizing the relationship between the two Acts 
the Court observed that much of the wording of the 
Occupational Disease Act was taken from the Work-
men's Compensation Act, then stated that: ". . . the in-
tent, purposes and objectives of the Occupational Dis-
ease Act, which is closely allied to the Workmen's 
Compensation Act, can be determined by reliance on 
former interpretations of the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act without searching through the refinements of 
construction necessary had the former act not been be-
fore the legislature on many occasions . . ." (113 Utah 
108). The Court further concluded (p. 123) that "the 
legislature occupied the complete field of silicosis. . . ." 
and later made the following observation pertinent to 
this controversy: ". . .If the legislature can deny the 
right to rely on the defense of contributory negligence 
and assumption of risk, and make the employer abso-
lutely liable regardless of fault, then we believe it also 
has the right to say that compensation shall not be 
awarded until the employee has brought himself within 
the terms of the statute/' (113 Utah 126) (emphasis 
added). 
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We submit that the rationale of the Masich opinion 
summarized above supports the application to the Utah 
Occupational Disease Act of the Henrie decision (113 
Utah 415) and that "compensation" includes burial ex-
penses and medical expenses in the Utah Occupational 
Disease Statute as well as in the Utah Constitution and 
the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act. Moreover, 
the Masich case indicates clearly that the Utah Legis-
lature did in fact cover the "complete field of silicosis" 
and that the legislature has made it clear that compen-
sation shall not be awarded until the employee (or any 
dependent seeking compensation) has brought himself 
within the terms of the statute. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the award of 
burial expenses to defendant Irene W. Peay, widow of 
Justin W. Peay, deceased, issued by the defendant In-
dustrial Commission of Utah in its Amended Order of 
February 22, 1974 was barred by the provisions of §35-
2-13 (b) (3), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
The conditions qualifying payment of compensation 
are clearly set forth in §35-2-13 of the Occupational 
Disease Statute; the pertinent definitions which ex-
pressly include burial expenses as a part of compensa-
tion, are clear and consistent in both language and ap-
plication; §35-2-13(b) (3) bars compensation of any 
kind for death which results more than five years after 
termination of employment; Justin W. Peay died al-
most 17 years after he last worked for Kennecott Cop-
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per Corporation. Under the clear language of the 
statute, supported by the decisions and rationale ex-
pressed in the Utah Supreme Court cases set forth 
above, the claim of applicant, dependent widow of Jus-
tin W. Peay, does not qualify for compensation pay-
ments of any kind, including burial expenses. There-
fore, the Amended Order heretofore entered by the 
Industrial Commission on February 24, 1974 and fin-
alized on April 15, 1974 was contrary to law and prop-
erly should be set aside. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J A M E S B. L E E 
E R I E V. BOORMAN 
of and for 
PARSONS, B E H L E & L A T I M E R 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
79 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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